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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article explores the question of whether or not the public's
interest in patent validity is sufficient to warrant mandatory judicial scrutiny
or public disclosure of infringement suit settlements coming out of court-
sponsored mediations.
The public's interest in the validity of patents stems from the status of
patents in the United States as limited monopolies granting a set of
exclusive rights to patent owners.' This grant of exclusive rights provides
some incentive to inventors and their backers to invest in research and
development. This incentive comes from the protection given inventions
that means investors and their backers are better assured of a possible
return on their investment. This grant of exclusive rights is justified
because it is made in exchange for the valid, full disclosure of an invention.
Such disclosure furthers the development of technology because it obviates
the need to reinvent the wheel: the information gained by other persons
working in related areas enables them to develop improvements to the
patented technology or to develop other inventions on the basis of the
information disclosed in the patent. The combination of the added
investment incentive given to inventors and the information gained by other
persons working in related areas leads to significant benefits for the public
in the form of new technological developments.
Where a patent is invalid, the public runs the risk that it will grant
exclusive rights without receiving the benefits that justify the grant of those
exclusive rights. As is discussed in Part II below, some issued patents turn
out to be invalid for a variety of reasons. Such invalidity may not be
obvious from the face of the patent, and absent the disclosures that come
out of the discovery process in federal court litigation, the invalidity may
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1 See infra Part II.
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never be discovered. If cases involving invalid patents are removed from
adjudication in a public forum by a court-sponsored mediation program,
discovery may be cut off, and the chances that the invalidity of the patent at
issue will remain undiscovered will increase.
At the point at which a patent owner seeks to employ the power of the
courts to enforce the patent, there is arguably no longer an absolute right to
keep private those matters relating to the settlement of the dispute. There is
precedent for a public interest limitation to the ability of private parties to
settle their disputes out of the public view. The United States Congress has
responded to the public's interesi in patent invalidity by requiring
disclosure to the public of the settlements of patent cases under several
circumstances. For interference cases in the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO), private settlements must be placed in the public
file associated with the patent in the PTO. 2 Furthermore, before Congress
acted in 1982 to allow arbitration of patent disputes, the courts had
consistently held that arbitration of patent disputes was contrary to the
public interest.3 When Congress acted to allow arbitrations of court cases
and interferences, it included provisions to require public disclosure of the
terms and reasons for the settlements that result. 4
As the application of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods to
patent disputes increases, 5 and particularly as federal judges require
increased use of mediation, 6 the question of whether it is desirable to
remove patent cases from public adjudication in the federal courts needs to
2 See infra Part V.C.
3 See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
5 David Plant has observed that:
Since the 1978 TRW-Telecredit minitrial in [the patent] field, ADR has been
tentatively explored here and skeptically utilized there, until perhaps the last half
dozen years during which many forms of ADR have been enthusiastically explored
and confidently utilized. The signs of the times suggest even wider and more
creative applications of ADR. We should all be fully prepared.
David W. Plant, ADR in IP Disputes, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW INSTITUTE:
1995, at 57, 79 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Property Course
Handbook Series No. 416, 1995).
6 Elizabeth Plapinger and Donna Stienstra have observed that "[miediation has
eclipsed arbitration as the primary ADR process in the federal district courts. Nearly
half the 94 district courts now offer-and many permit judges to require-mediation."
Elizabeth Plapinger & Donna Stienstra, Federal Court ADR: A Practitioner's Update,
14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COSTS LITIG. 7, 7 (1996).
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be addressed. While a fair number of commentators have examined and
discussed the efficacy of ADR in general (and arbitration and mini-trials
specifically) as they relate to patent disputes, much of this discussion is
very general and serves primarily to introduce the concepts and definitions
of the various available ADR methods. 7 Very little has been published on
the application of mediation processes to disputes over patents, and, in the
ADR literature, even less has been published on mediation processes
applied to patent infringement disputes. 8
Requiring judicial scrutiny or public disclosure of settlements arising
out of court-sponsored mediation programs would not be cost free. For
example, scrutiny or disclosure could lead to a decrease in the incentives
for the settlements that these programs are supposed to foster. If mediation
and settlement of patent infringement suits is a desirable process, then the
benefits flowing from scrutiny or disclosure of settlements would need to
outweigh any loss of benefits flowing out of the mediation of these
disputes.
Those who advocate mediation of patent infringement disputes advance
the same reasons advanced by advocates of mediation for general types of
suits. 9 Patent infringement suits are believed by commentators and some
judges to take up a disproportionate amount of judicial resources.10 If
mediation can contribute to a lessening of federal court caseloads, then
mediation of patent disputes can have a significant impact on those
7 See generally Tom Arnold, Why ADR, in PATENT LITIGATION 1996, at 245 (PLI
Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Property Course Handbook Series No.
457, 1996); Kevin R. Casey, Alternate Dispute Resolution and Patent Law, 3 FED.
CIRCUIT B.J. 1 (1993); Eric D. Green, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Patent and
Antitrust Cases, in PATENT ANTTrRuST 1989, at 479 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks, & Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 270, 1989).
8 See Margaret E. Anderson, Intellectual Property Mediations: Special Techniques
for a Special Field, 3 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 23, 23 (1994).
9 See generally Arnold, supra note 7; infra note 35 and accompanying text.
10 See UNITED STATES DIST. COURT FOR THE N. DIST. OF TEx., CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM ACT ADVISORY COMMITrEE REPORT 49-50 (1992), available in 1992 WL
518800; UNITED STATES DIST. COURT FOR THE S. DIST. OF OHIO, CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM ACT REPORT: FIRST REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP app. (1993), available in
1993 WL 524456; Joseph T. McLaughlin & Karen M. Crupi, Alternative Dispute
Resolution, ALI-ABA COURSE STUDY, ARB., MEDIATION, & OTHER ADR METHODS,
Nov. 18, 1993, at 49, 53; William K. Slate II, Proceedings of the Middle Atlantic
State-Federal Judicial Relationships Conference, 162 F.R.D. 173, 222 (1995). See
generally Judicial Backlog, 13 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COSTS LITIG. 129, 129 (1995)
(discussing the numbers of backlogged cases in the federal courts).
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caseloads. Furthermore, patent infringement disputes often arise between
parties already in a contractual relationship-parties who would arguably be
better off if they are able to maintain a continuing relationship. A chief
advantage of mediated agreements is that they often allow parties to
continue ongoing relationships.
Another reason advanced in favor of mediation of patent infringement
suits is quick resolution of disputes so as to remove clouds on the title of
patents created by lawsuits. The cloud created on titles of patents by
litigation is said to come into place as soon as knowledge of a suit involving
a patent becomes public,"l and the value of the patent diminishes due to a
cloud on the title. Clouds on the title of patents arguably have a great
influence on the willingness of patent holders to settle and on the amounts
of settlements and provide significant reasons to favor ADR processes.12
A final reason advanced by advocates of ADR for using mediation to
solve patent infringement disputes is the tremendous cost savings over
traditional litigation of patent infringement disputes. As is discussed below
in Part III, mediation has the potential to save parties to a dispute a great
deal of the cost associated with traditional lawsuits.
This Article will review the arguments in favor of and against public
encouragement of mediation and private settlement of patent infringement
disputes. The balance between these arguments may be viewed as a balance
between the possible private gain of the parties and individual courts and
the possible loss to the public of what commentators term "public goods"
that come out of public adjudication by public authorities. These private
and public gains will be explored both in relation to patent infringement
disputes and in relation to the closely related issue of antitrust liability from
settlement of patent disputes.
II. PATENT LAW BASICS 13
The right of inventors to protect their inventions was contemplated by
the framers of the United States Constitution. Article I of the United States
Constitution empowers Congress to "promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
11 See Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A
Critique of Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2169,
2204 n. 129 (1993).
12 See id. at 2201.
13 For a good general overview of patent law for the nonspecialist, see HERBERT F.
SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 49-73 (2d ed. 1995).
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exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."' 14 Congress
has exercised this power by establishing the PTO and by passing statutes
relating to patent protection that, among other things, grant exclusive rights
for twenty years from the date of application, to "[w]hoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof."15
To obtain a patent, an inventor must show that the invention complies
with the requirements set out in the patent statutes. The invention must be
of patentable subject matter, 16 it must be useful, 17 it must be novel, 18 and it
must be nonobvious.19 Additionally, the applicant for the patent must be the
original inventor 20 and must file for the patent in a timely manner so as to
avoid various statutory time bars involving other patents and publications. 21
The application (the text of which matures into the patent itself) must
adequately disclose the invention to enable others to practice it following
expiration of the patent term,22 including a description of the best mode of
practicing the invention as understood by the inventor at the time of filing
the application. 23
The application also must describe the invention in such a manner as to
distinctly claim the invention. 24 Failure in any one of the requirements
listed in the paragraph above should mean that the PTO will reject an
application for a patent. The PTO, however, is not perfect in its
examination of patent applications, and invalid patents issue as a result of
this imperfection. Until a patent becomes the subject of litigation, an invalid
but issued patent looks to all the world like a grant to the inventor of
exclusive rights over the invention, and the patent enjoys a strong statutory
presumption of validity.25
14 U.S. CONS'r. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
15 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994); see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 271(a) (1994).
16 See 35 U.S.C. § 101.
17 See id.
18 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
19 See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (Supp. 111996).
20 See id. § 102(f).
21 See id. § 102(b).
22 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
23 See id.
24 See id.
25 See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994 & Supp. I 1996).
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The exclusive rights granted an inventor are found in 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(a): "whoever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented
invention, within the United States during the term of the patent therefor,
infringes the patent."' 26 When someone is accused of infringing a patent,
there are four basic issues that must be resolved in order for the dispute to
be settled.27 These issues are the following: whether or not the patent is
valid, whether or not the patent is enforceable, whether or not the patent
has been infringed, and to what relief, if any, either the patentee or the
accused infringer is entitled. 28
In addition to suits over infringement in the federal courts, the issue of
patent validity may also be contested by a third party in the PTO in the
following two ways: (1) anyone may petition the PTO for re-examination of
a patent, and (2) a person with a pending patent application claiming the
same invention may institute an interference proceeding under 35 U.S.C.
§ 135 within a year of the issuance of the patent in question. 29 Re-
examination proceedings are largely ex parte between the PTO and the
inventor, while interferences are more akin to litigation where the parties
trying to claim the same invention battle it out in a hearing before the PTO
Board of Interferences.
The overwhelming majority of patent infringement suits in federal court
do not reach trial, 30 and roughly eighty percent of interferences in the PTO
settle before a final judgment is rendered. 31 In both fora, the general means
of settlement is by license agreement between the parties; in the federal
court suit, the parties often ask the court to enter a consent decree, 32 and
26 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994).
27 See Keith V. Rockey, Overview of a Patent Suit: The Decision to File, in
WINNING STRATEGIES IN PATENT LITIGATION 1995, at 143, 152 (PLI Patents,
Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G-423,
1995).
28 See id.
29 See 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1994).
30 See HOWARD C. ANAWALT & ELIZABETH F. ENAYATI, IP STRATEGY:
COMPLETE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PLANNING, ACCESS AND PROTECTION, 1998
EDITION § 5.09[3] at 406 (1998).
31 See Ian A. Calvert & Michael Sofocleous, Interference Statistics for Fiscal Years
1989 to 1991, 74 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 822, 825 (1992).
32 See Mark Crane & Malcolm R. Pfunder, Antitrust and Res Judicata
Considerations in the Settlement of Patent Litigation, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 151, 151-152
(1993).
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settlements of interferences at the PTO result in a settlement agreement
being entered into the public examination record of the patent or patents. 33
III. MEDIATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO WHAT?
Commentators have advocated the use of ADR generally and mediation
specifically to resolve patent infringement disputes for many of the same
reasons that ADR advocates offer for cases generally. 34 Tom Arnold of
Arnold, White & Durkee has been a long-time advocate of the use of ADR
in resolving patent disputes, and he has published a series of articles
ranging from outlines of his lecture notes, through articles, up to an entire
text on the subject. 35 Based on his experience in the application of ADR to
33 See 35 U.S.C. § 135(c). For a discussion of issues raised in ,settlement
agreements in interference proceedings, see Gerald Sobel, Exploitation of Patents and
the Antitrust Laws, in TECHNOLOGY LICENSING AND LITIGATION 115, 156 (PLI Patents,
Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 431, 1996).
34 See STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION 143-148 (2d ed.
1992).
35See generally TOM ARNOLD ET AL., PATENT ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION HANDBOOK (1991); Tom Arnold, A Vocabulary of ADR Procedures, in
WINNING STRATEGIES IN PATENT LITIGATION 381 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks, & Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 423, 1995); Tom
Arnold, A Vocabulary of Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures, in ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: How TO USE IT TO YOUR ADVANTAGE! 41 (ALI-ABA Course of
Study Materials No. CA13, 1996); Tom Arnold, Advocacy in Mediation, in
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: How TO USE IT TO YOUR ADVANTAGE!, supra, at
535; Tom Arnold, Arbitration Clause Checklist, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
How TO USE IT TO YOUR ADVANTAGE! 307 (ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials No.
SB41, 1996); Tom Arnold, Client Preparation for Mediation: Annotated Check List for
Lawyer-Client Conference, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: HOW TO USE IT TO
YOUR ADVANTAGE!, supra, at 527; Tom Arnold, Delay and Cost Booby Traps in
Arbitration Practice and How to Avoid Them, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
HOW TO USE IT TO YOUR ADVANTAGE!, supra, at 99; Tom Arnold, MEDALOA, the
Dispute Resolution Process of Choice, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: How TO
USE IT TO YOUR ADVANTAGE!, supra, at 365; Tom Arnold, MEDALOA, the Dispute
Resolution Process of Choice, in WINNING STRATEGIES IN PATENT LITIGATION, supra,
at 449; Tom Arnold, Mediation Outline: A Practical How-To Guide for Mediators and
Attorneys, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: How TO USE IT TO YOUR
ADVANTAGE!, supra, at 425; Tom Arnold, Professional Responsibility in ADR, in
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: How TO USE IT TO YOUR ADVANTAGE! 527 (ALI-
ABA Course of Study Materials No. SB41, 1996); Tom Arnold, Suggested Form of
Contract to Arbitrate a Patent or Other Commercial Dispute, Annotated, 2 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 205 (1994) [hereinafter Arnold, Suggested Form of Contract to
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patent disputes, Arnold suggests that the advantages of ADR over litigation
are the following: control of the process; money savings to the parties; time
savings; the parties' ability to select the "judge"; preservation of
relationships among the parties; privacy and confidentiality of the process
and the outcomes; the ability to forge creative, win-win business solutions;
the results of mediation are flexible and rational; that it is possible to avoid
litigation in the other party's home forum; and that arbitration awards are
easily enforced. 36 Other commentators have suggested that even when
ADR methods are ineffective in producing a settlement, they narrow the
issues for trial sufficiently to make their use a real benefit to the parties. 37
Arnold and other commentators 38 have also suggested that ADR methods
result in fairer outcomes. Arnold, for example, has gone so far as to say
"[o]nly mediation or some other negotiation type format has a chance of
doing substantial justice in this and many other fact patterns.-Fact patterns
where fairness obtainable by an ADR process is simply not obtainable at
the court house." 39 Arnold, then, sees mediation as an alternative to what is
obtainable at the courthouse (that is, to formal adjudication). But this
juxtaposition of mediation and formal adjudication may be a false
dichotomy in general and specifically in relation to patent infringement
disputes.
Arbitrate]; Tom Arnold, Twenty Common Errors in Mediation Advocacy, in WINNING
STRATEGIES IN PATENT LITIGATION, supra, at 433; Tom Arnold, Twenty Common
Errors in Mediation Advocacy-In No Particular Order, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: HOW TO USE IT TO YOUR ADVANTAGE!, supra, at 579; Tom Arnold, Why
ADR, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: How TO USE IT TO YOUR ADVANTAGE!,
supra, at 13; Arnold, supra note 7; Tom Arnold, Why ADR with Booby Traps in
Arbitration Practice and How to Avoid Them, in WINNING STRATEGIES IN PATENT
LITIGATION, supra, at 357; Tom Arnold, 20 Common Errors in Mediation Advocacy, 13
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COSTS LITIG. 69 (1995); Tom Arnold & Murray Nadler, An
Annotated Form of a Commercial Contract Clause for Low Budget MEDALOA Dispute
Resolution, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: How TO USE IT TO YOUR
ADVANTAGE!, supra, at 381. In many of Arnold's articles, the text and arguments do
not change very much from article to article. I include references to most of Arnold's
exemplary and recent articles in this footnote for the interested reader; in subsequent
footnotes, I will refer only to a single instance of a point that Arnold may make
identically in many articles.
36 See generally sources cited supra note 35.
37 See Miriam R. Arfin, The Benefits of Alternative Dispute Resolution in
Intellectual Property Disputes, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 893, 898-899 (1995).
38 See, e.g., Casey, supra note 7, at 4.
39 Arnold, supra note 7, at 271.
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It has become conventional wisdom that most civil cases in the United
States settle irrespective of the dispute resolution means employed by the
parties. The proposition that most suits settle before a court rules on them
has been advanced as a reason not to be concerned over public support for
ADR programs that remove cases from the court dockets and thus from the
possibility of a public adjudication. 4° Settlement rates for civil suits in
general are estimated at between eighty-five and ninety percent. 41 For
patent infringement cases, as noted above, settlement rates are said to be
roughly eighty percent. 42 These settlement rates represent estimates only
and are based on anecdotal evidence or on only a few studies, and
questions have been raised as to exactly what the figures represent.43
Galanter and other commentators have argued that settlement of civil suits
does not take place in a vacuum; judges and judicial rulings provide a
shadow under which settlement takes place, and their presence has a strong
influence on case settlements. 44 If settlements are driven in part by the
shadow of the courts, then to propose that ADR is preferable to "what is
available at the courthouse" is to miss the important point that but for what
is available at the courthouse, the form and number of extra-judicial
settlements would change significantly.
One often-cited study that addresses the questions both of how often
civil cases settle and what influences their settlement found that less than
eight percent of civil cases went to trial and two-thirds of civil cases settled
by voluntary agreement between the parties. 45 Trubek and Kritzer present
their data in sufficient detail to permit a comparison of their data to
available data on patent infringement cases.
40 See Sid Stahl, Legal Landscape in Texas Encourages ADR, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO
HIGH COSTS LrIG. 33, 33 (1994).
41 See Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema,
99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 670 (1986); Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle":
Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339-1340
(1994).
42 See Plapinger & Stienstra, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
43 See Galanter & Cahill, supra note 41, at 1341.
44 See id. at 1340; Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 952-956 (1979).
45 See David M. Trubek & Herbert M. Kritzer, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation,
31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 89 (1983).
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IV. MEDIATION AND SETTLEMENT OF PATENT
INFRINGEMENT DISPUTES
Comparison of the available data on patent infringement cases to the
data in the Trubek and Kritzer study leads to the inescapable conclusion
that patent infringement cases are atypical when compared to what Trubek
and Kritzer term the "ordinary lawsuit."'46 Cases in the Trubek and Kritzer
study were characterized in part by the amount of money involved in the
dispute. Trubek and Kritzer's data show that in the early 1980s, only
twelve percent of civil cases in their study involved fifty thousand dollars
or more.
47
The American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) conducts
biennial surveys of patent attorneys who are members of the Association. 48
In its most recent survey (conducted in 1995), the AIPLA for the first time
asked two questions involving estimates of the "value at risk" in their
patent infringement suits. (Value at risk was defined as the difference
between the best and worst possible outcomes of the cases.) The first
question linked the value at risk of a typical patent infringement suit to an
estimate of the total cost through the end of discovery of a patent
infringement suit; the second question linked the value at risk of a typical
patent infringement suit to an estimate of the total cost inclusive of all
discovery, motions, pretrial, trial, post-trial, and appeal. 49
46 Id. at 90.
47 See id. at 89.
48 See COMMITTEE ON ECONS. OF LEGAL PRACTICE, AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF ECONOMIC SURVEY 1995, at 1 (1995). The survey is
of all members in private and government practice; 1545 attorneys responded to the
1995 survey. See id. These attorneys ranged from sole practitioners to partners in the
largest firms, as well as corporate in-house counsel and attorneys working at the PTO.
See id. at 1-2.
49 See id. app. A at 4. The exact two-part questions posed to AIPLA members
were:
46. A. Estimate of total cost, through end of discovery, in a patent infringement
suit:
B. Estimate of Average Value at Risk (difference between best possible and
worst possible outcomes) in recent suits on which cost estimate is based:
< $hnillion $1-10 million $10-100 million > $100 million
47. A. Estimate of total cost inclusive of all discovery, all motions, pre-trial, trial,
post-trial, and appeal, in a patent infringement suit:
$_______
[Vol. 14:2 1999]
MEDIATION AND SETTLEMENT OF PATENT DISPUTES
Figure 1 is a graph of the responses to these questions from the AIPLA
1995 survey. 50 This graph illustrates that in the vast majority of patent
infringement suits the stakes far exceed fifty thousand dollars. Even
allowing for increases over the ten-year period between the Trubek and
Kritzer and the AIPLA data, and even allowing for the phrasing of the
AIPLA question in terms of the difference between best and worst possible
outcomes of the suits, 51 one may conclude that the stakes in patent
infringement suits are far greater than the stakes in the general civil suits
analyzed and described by Trubek and Kritzer. 52
Patent infringement suits differ from the suits in the Trubek and Kritzer
study in other important ways as well. For example, Trubek and Kritzer
found that "relatively little discovery occurs in the ordinary lawsuit.' 53 The
data in Figure 1 show, and at least one federal judge believes, 54 that
B. Estimate of Average Value at Risk (difference between best possible and
worst possible outcomes) in recent suits on which cost estimate is based:
< $1 million $1-10 million $10-100 million > $100 million
Id.
50 See id.; see also infra Appendix.
51 What is being asked for in these questions as the "average value at risk" is
ambiguous. These questions could be interpreted in at least the following two ways: (1)
they could be asking for an estimate of the possible damages that could be received or
paid in comparison to no award of damages, in which case the value is not significantly
different from Trubek and Kritzer's measure of the stakes in civil suits; or (2) they
could be asking for an estimate of damages in comparison to what a patent holder stands
to lose if the patent is found to be invalid.
52 That the stakes in an infringement suit are so high is understandable. In 1993,
the legal fees for drafting, filing, and arguing a normal high technology patent
application through all stages short of appeal with the PTO were estimated to run
between five and ten thousand dollars; when significant difficulty is encountered in the
prosecution of a patent, the fees can go well beyond these numbers. A patent holder also
must pay maintenance and application fees to the PTO that run into the thousands of
dollars, so a technology worth patenting is likely to have a reasonably high value to the
patent holder or anyone else who might try to exploit it. The numbers from the 1993
survey rather than from the 1995 survey were used for two reasons. First, the format of
the questions used in the 1993 survey made interpretation of the numbers much simpler
because of possibly ambiguous wording of the questions in the 1995 survey, and second,
newer patents falling under the 1995 survey are less likely to have been subject to
litigation. See COMMITTEE ON ECONS. OF LEGAL PRACTICE, AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF ECONOMIC SURVEY 1993, at 34 (1993).
53 Trubek & Kritzer, supra note 45, at 90.
54 See UNrrED STATES DIsT. COURT FOR THE S. DisT. OF OHIO, supra note 10, at
app.
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discovery is a major cost in patent infringement suits; a relatively large
amount of discovery, then, occurs in patent infringement suits, in contrast
to the ordinary suit described by Trubek and Kritzer. Patent infringement
suits also cost a great deal more to litigate than the ordinary civil suit.
Trubek and Kritzer state that "legal fees in the world of ordinary litigation
are modest." 55 Only thirteen out of one hundred federal court cases studied
by Trubek and Kritzer involved legal fees in excess of ten thousand
dollars. 56 In contrast to these results, according to one report, patent
infringement litigation in the early 1980s typically cost between $250,000
and $500,000. 57 Litigation cost figures from the AIPLA economic surveys
of the early 1990s are plotted in Figure 2.58
So if patent infringement suits differ from ordinary suits, does this
mean that they are any more or less suitable for mediation? Arnold and
others argue that in general, patent infringement suits are ideal candidates
for mediation precisely because they are so expensive and complex to
litigate. 59 Mediation has proved valuable in settling complex patent cases.
For example, data from the most recent AIPLA economic survey indicate
some success in settling patent infringement suits by mediation. Figure 3
plots the numbers of cases for which mediation was reported either to have
been effective or ineffective as a function of the estimated value at risk in
the suits. 60
The following four points emerge from examination of Figure 3: (1)
mediation is successful in helping to resolve a significant proportion of
patent infringement suits in which it is used, but not anywhere near the
ninety percent success rates touted by ADR advocates; 61 (2) comparing
Figure 3 to Figure 1, with respect to the distribution of the value at risk in
the suits, the suits in which mediation was attempted do not differ
55 Trubek & Kritzer, supra note 45, at 92.
56 See id. at 92 tbl.4.
57 See Brian Peckham, Should the U.S. Patent Laws Be Abolished?, 11 J.
CONTEMP. L. 389, 399 (1985).
58 See infra Appendix.
59 See Arnold, supra note 7, at 270; Plant, supra note 5, at 79; Nancy Neal Yeend
& Cathie E. Rincon, ADR and Intellectual Property: A Prudent Option, 36 IDEA 601,
601 (1996).
60 See infra Appendix.
61 At least one commentator has stated that she is aware of no studies that break
out success rates for intellectual property mediations, but her personal impression is that
success rates are lower for intellectual property disputes than for disputes in general.
See Anderson, supra note 8, at 23.
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significantly from general patent infringement suits; (3) also comparing
Figure 3 to Figure 1, the number of infringement suits in which mediation
was attempted is relatively small in comparison to the overall number of
infringement suits; and (4) mediation would appear to be more effective in
settling lower value at risk cases. 62
Furthermore, Arnold argues,63 and the 1995 AIPLA data suggest, 64
that even where the mediation is ineffective, the cost of the mediation in
comparison to the overall cost of the litigation is small. Figure 4 plots both
the estimated cost of ineffective mediation and the estimated total cost of
litigating patent infringement suits. 65 It is clear from Figure 4 that next to
the total cost of litigating a patent infringement suit, the cost of attempted
but unsuccessful mediation is barely discernable.
The cost of effective mediation also argues strongly for the use of
mediation to settle patent infringement suits. As small as the cost of
ineffective mediation is relative to total litigation costs, the cost of effective
mediation in settling a suit is even smaller. Figure 5 plots the 1995 AIPLA
economic survey estimated cost data for mediation of suits in which
mediation was and was not effective. 66 Excluding the lowest cost
mediations (whose costs are similar irrespective of the success of the
mediation), respondents in the survey estimated the cost of a successful
mediation to be roughly one-half the cost of an unsuccessful mediation.
Conclusions based on these AIPLA survey data need to be drawn with
some degree of caution. These data are based on surveys that ask attorneys
to report estimates based on their own experiences. A recent RAND study
suggests that such estimates may not be entirely reliable. 67 The RAND
study measured variables such as time from case filing to disposition (TTD)
and litigation costs for two groups of cases in six different federal districts.
The cases in one group were submitted to mediation or early neutral
62 The reason for easier settlement of less expensive suits is unclear. Assuming the
effect is real, this Author might hypothesize that the more value at risk, the more issues
may be involved between the parties. Where there are more issues between the parties,
the likelihood of settlement decreases.
63 See Arnold, supra note 7, at 263.
64 See COMMITTEE ON ECONS. OF LEGAL PRACTICE, AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAw Ass'N, supra note 48, at 61 tbl.22, 64 tbl.22.
65 See infra Appendix.
66 See infra Appendix.
67 See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND EARLY
NEUTRAL EVALUATION UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 1 (1996) (explaining the
RAND study in Santa Monica, California).
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evaluation (ENE), while the cases in the control group were not subject to
any formal ADR process. 68 The RAND researchers also surveyed the
attorneys who were involved in the cases that went to mediation or ENE
and asked them to evaluate the effect of the mediation or ENE on, among
other things, the TTD and litigation costs. The RAND researchers
concluded that when they controlled for differences between the cases in
the two groups, case submission to mediation or ENE in most of the study
districts did not reduce the TTD and litigation costs and increased the TTD
or litigation costs in several of the study districts. 69 The attorney survey
data, however, indicated that some attorneys believed that the mediation or
ENE reduced both the TTD and the litigation costs. 70 This RAND study is
not without its critics, 71 and it is open to some criticism on methodological
grounds. 72 Nonetheless, the differences in the RAND study between the
data obtained from lawyer self-reporting and the more objective data do
point out the need for caution when drawing conclusions from surveys like
those of the AIPLA.
As with mediation of general sorts of civil disputes, mediation of patent
infringement suits would appear to provide a successful, low-cost means for
achieving settlement. Success and cost savings to the parties, however, do
not provide a rationale for public support for mediation of cases for which
68 See id. at 20-22.
69 See id. at 34.
70 See id. at 35.
71 See, e.g., John Gibeaut, Was RAND Right?, A.B.A. J., May 1997, at 98, 98.
72 The conclusions of the RAND study are based on a complex multivariate model
that was necessitated by the nonrandom selection of cases in some of the study districts.
See KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 67, at 59-61. Not all of the study districts used
nonrandom case selection, and the authors admit in a footnote to an appendix that in at
least two of the districts in which the multivariate model is unnecessary, there is a
statistically significant decrease in TTD attributable to the mediation program. See id. at
284 n.4. Furthermore, because of the non-normal distribution of the data, the data for
TTD were transformed using a highly unusual fourth-root transform. See id. at 278.
Perhaps because of this transformation, and certainly because of the complexity of their
model, the authors are forced to admit that the power of their tests to show a difference
in TTD due to the ADR programs is not great enough to distinguish time differences of
less than several months. See id. at 35. They also set their significance level to p =
0.05, which is a level that is more in keeping with what is used in the hard sciences
rather than in the social sciences. See id. at 27 n. 14. At the same time, no criticism of
the RAND researchers' methodology can explain away their finding of a statistically
significant increase both in the TTD and litigation costs attributable to the mediation
program in the Southern District of Texas. See id. at 170, 174.
[Vol. 14:2 1999]
MEDIATION AND SETTLEMENT OF PATENT DISPUTES
there might be an overriding public interest in public adjudication. Patent
infringement cases raise issues of public concern,73 and thus care needs to
be taken in deciding that public support should be brought to bear on
moving patent infringement suits out of the light of public adjudication and
into the arena of private, mediated settlement.
V. MEDIATION OF PATENT DISPUTES IN THE SHADOW OF THE
PUBLIC INTEREST
Issued patents arguably have a chilling effect on competition. For
example, one study of patenting practices in the biotechnology area found
an inverse correlation between the number of existing patents in a
particular sub-area, and the number of competitors undertaking research
and development and applying for patents in that sub-area. 74 If an issued
patent is invalid but not obviously so, there is no reason to believe that it
will not also lead to decreased competition. Because competition as well as
increased research and development provide a large part of the rationale
underlying the patent laws, public support of a process that may lead to
reduced public awareness of the invalidity of issued patents, and thus to a
decrease in research and development, raises significant concerns.
Many commentators have recognized possible danger to the public
interest where certain cases are removed by ADR from the public realm. 75
This Part explores the public interest issues that arise when patent
73 See Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternate Dispute Resolution, 62
TUL. L. REV. 1, 44 n.227 (1987).
74 See Josh Lemer, Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors, 38 J.L. & ECON. 463,
482 (1995). Although this study focused on the influence of litigation cost on the
willingness of biotechnology firms to compete in crowded sub-areas, the data and
analysis nonetheless reveal an awareness on the part of biotechnology companies of the
research and development activities of their competitors and a hesitancy to compete in
sub-areas that are already covered by issued patents.
75 See, e.g., Brunet, supra note 73, at 40; Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93
YALE L.J. 1073, 1085-1087 (1984); Galanter & Cahill, supra note 41, at 1346; Mori
Irvine, The Lady or the Tiger: Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 27 U. TOL. L.
REv. 795, 800-801 (1996); David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public
Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2622 (1995); Judith L. Maute, Public Values and Private
Justice: A Case for Mediator Accountability, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 503, 507-508
(1991); H. Lee Sarokin, Justice Rushed Is Justice Ruined, 38 RUTGERS L. REV. 431,
433 (1986); Jack B. Weinstein, Some Benefits and Risks of Privatization of Justice
Through ADR, 11 OHIo ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 241, 246 (1996).
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infringement suits are removed by ADR from the public into the private
realm.
A. Patent Monopolies and the Public Interest
The patent law of the United States is designed to strike a balance
between granting benefits to the public from disclosure of useful inventions
and benefits to the inventor in providing a means for protecting the
inventor's investment of personal resources in developing a new
invention. 76 Some commentators view patent law as primarily designed to
serve the public interest and secondarily designed to provide private
benefits, 77 while others view the purpose of patent laws as primarily for the
benefit of the inventor. 78 Because patent rights are property rights, the
public has an interest in the ownership of those rights.79 As a result of this
public interest, patent protection has been said to raise "quasi-public
issues," 80 and some commentators worry that ADR techniques may
therefore be inappropriate for resolution of patent disputes. 81
The lower federal courts have held that patent infringement and validity
raise matters of public interest.82 The United States Supreme Court, for its
part, has observed that the purposes of the patent laws were well expressed
in Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery
Co.:83
76 For a thorough discussion of the development of and theory behind patent rights,
see Michael Paul Chu, An Antitrust Solution to the New Wave of Predatory Patent
hfringement Litigation, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1341, 1346-1348 (1992).
77 See, e.g., Gerald Kenyon, Case Note, Patent Law: The Res Judicata Effect of
Consent Decrees in Patent Litigation-Lear, Inc. v. Adkins Takes a Back Seat-Foster
v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469 (Fed. Cir. 1991), 18 U. DAYTON L. REv. 139, 152
(1992).
78 See, e.g., Joel R. Bennett, Patent Misuse: Must an Alleged Infringer Prove an
Antitrust Violation?, 17 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 5 (1989).
79 See Bryan Niblett, Arbitrating the Creative, DisP. RESOL. J., Jan. 1995, at 64,
67.
80 Jill E. Fisch, Rewriting History: The Propriey of Eradicating Prior Decisional
Law Through Settlement and Vacatur, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 589, 624 (1991).
81 See, e.g., Bart J. van den Broek et al., The Use of ADR in Disputes Involving
the Patent and Trademark Office, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 27, 1997, at C18.
82 See, e.g., PPG Indus., Inc. v. Westwood Chem., Inc., 530 F.2d 700, 705 (6th
Cir. 1976).
83 324 U.S. 806 (1945).
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A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest . . . . [It] is an
exception to the general rule against monopolies and to the right to access
to a free and open market. The far-reaching social and economic
consequences of a patent, therefore, give the public a paramount interest
in seeing that patent monopolies spring from backgrounds free from fraud
or other inequitable conduct and that such monopolies are kept within their
legitimate scope. 84
The Supreme Court has recognized that this paramount public interest goes
beyond seeing that patent monopolies do not spring from fraud or other
inequitable conduct. In particular, the Supreme Court has held that this
paramount public interest is sufficient to overcome issues of efficient
management of a court's docket. In Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton
International, Inc.,85 the Supreme Court struck down a long-standing
practice86 of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal
Circuit)87 and other federal courts. Before Cardinal Chemical, federal
district courts had routinely vacated their own judgments relating to patent
invalidity if there were later findings of noninfringement, and the courts of
appeals, including the Federal Circuit, had routinely refused to grant
appeals to either party to an infringement suit for the purpose of
determining patent validity if there had been an affirmance of a lower court
finding of noninfringement. 88 The Court in Cardinal Chemical observed
that:
[T]here might be a sufficient reason always to address the infringement
issue before passing on the patent's validity. If, for example, the validity
issues were generally more difficult and time consuming to resolve, the
interest in the efficient management of the court's docket might support
such a rule.
84 Id. at 816, quoted with approval in Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach.
Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965).
85 508 U.S. 83 (1993).
86 See id. at 102.
87 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created in 1982 and has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent matters. Some commentators argue that the
explosion in the cost and frequency of patent litigation is due to the establishment of the
Federal Circuit and the purportedly pro-patent stance it has taken. See Lemer, supra
note 74, at 469.
88 This vacatur and refusal to hear appeals stemmed from the notion that once there
was a finding of noninfringement, there was no longer a case and controversy out of
which a ruling on patent validity might stem. See Cardinal Chemical, 508 U.S. at 89-
95.
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Although it is often more difficult to determine whether a patent is
valid than whether it has been infringed, there are even more important
countervailing concerns. 89
The countervailing concerns cited by the Court were the parties' interests
(particularly that of the accused infringer), uncertainty as to the patent
validity so as to be able to guide their future actions, and the public's
strong interest in resolving questions about patent validity. 90
The public's interest in the issue of patent validity also is not overcome
by the parties' rights to enter into private contractual relationships. The
Supreme Court held in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins9' that a licensee to a patent
could not be estopped from challenging the validity of the patent under
license by means of a no-challenge clause in the license. 92 One federal
district court interpreted that Lear "clearly held that removing the restraint
on commerce caused by exercise of an invalid patent is more important
than enforcing a promise between contracting parties.193 Settlement
agreements, whether mediated or not, represent promises between
contracting parties. Lear, then, may be interpreted to argue against public
encouragement of private mediated settlements.
Thus there is a recognized public interest in having patent validity
adjudicated. The public interest in exposure of invalid patents is sufficient
to require courts to pass judgment on validity despite the arguably more
efficient approach of ending a case following a judgment of
noninfringement, and this public interest is also arguably sufficient to
overcome the parties' private rights to enter into contracts. In the areas of
arbitration of patent disputes and settlement of patent interferences, the
courts and Congress have made direct statements to this same effect. 94
89 Id. at 99.
90 See id. at 100.
91 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
92 See id. at 670-671.
93 Lemelson v. Synergistics Research Corp., 669 F. Supp. 642, 646 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (citation omitted).
94 See, e.g., discussion supra note 93 and accompanying text; infra Part V.B.
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B. Public Disclosure of Patent Arbitration Agreements
Courts historically held private agreements to resolve patent
infringement disputes to be void as against public policy.95 Only with the
passage of 35 U.S.C. § 294 in 1982, did Congress legislatively overrule
these holdings to some extent.96 The exact extent to which 35 U.S.C. § 294
renders moot any objections to public support for mediation of patent
disputes is a matter of some debate. What is certain is that 35 U.S.C. § 294
makes voluntary agreements to arbitrate patent disputes enforceable as long
as certain requirements are met.97 At least one commentator has proposed
95 See Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d 55, 62-63
(7th Cir. 1970); Foster Wheeler Corp. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 440 F. Supp. 897,
901 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Public Serv. Co., 193 U.S.P.Q. 161,
163 (S.D. Ind. 1976); Diematic Mfg. Corp. v. Packaging Indus., Inc., 381 F. Supp.
1057, 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Homewood Indus., Inc. v. Caldwell, 360 F. Supp. 1201,
1204 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
96 See 35 U.S.C. § 294 (1994).
97 The text of 35 U.S.C. § 294 reads as follows:
(a) A contract involving a patent or any right under a patent may contain a
provision requiring arbitration of any dispute relating to patent validity or
infringement arising under the contract. In the absence of such a provision, the
parties to an existing patent validity or infringement dispute may agree in writing
to settle such dispute by arbitration. Any such provision or agreement shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except for any grounds that exist at law or in
equity for revocation of a contract.
(b) Arbitration of such disputes, awards by arbitrators and confirmation of
awards shall be governed by title 9, United States Code, to the extent such title is
not inconsistent with this section. In any such arbitration proceeding, the defenses
provided for under section 282 of this title shall be considered by the arbitrator if
raised by any party to the proceeding.
(c) An award by an arbitrator shall be final and binding between the parties to
the arbitration but shall have no force or effect on any other person. The parties to
an arbitration may agree that in the event a patent which is the subject matter of an
award is subsequently determined to be invalid or unenforceable in a judgment
rendered by a court to [sic] competent jurisdiction from which no appeal can or has
been taken, such award may be modified by any court of competent jurisdiction
upon application by any party to the arbitration. Any such modification shall
govern the rights and obligations between such parties from the date of such
modification.
(d) When an award is made by an arbitrator, the patentee, his assignee or
licensee shall give notice thereof in writing to the Commissioner. There shall be a
separate notice prepared for each patent involved in such proceeding. Such notice
shall set forth the names and addresses of the parties, the name of the inventor, and
the name of the patent owner, shall designate the number of the patent, and shall
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that 35 U.S.C. § 294 evinces a congressional policy in favor of any and all
applications of ADR to patent disputes. 98 Such a proposal requires careful
examination.
Arbitration awards are neither private nor are they to be made without
the arbitrator ruling on patent validity. One of the requirements for
enforceability of arbitration clauses in patent disputes is that if the parties
raise defenses under 35 U.S.C. § 282, the arbitrator must consider these
defenses. 99 35 U.S.C. § 282 delineates four defenses, two of which involve
patent invalidity, the third of which is a catch-all, and the fourth of which
relates to noninfringement. 100 If an accused infringer raises a defense of
contain a copy of the award. If an award is modified by a court, the party
requesting such modification shall give notice of such modification to the
Commissioner. The Commissioner shall, upon receipt of either notice, enter the
same in the record of the prosecution of such patent. If the required notice is not
filed with the Commissioner, any party to the proceeding may provide such notice
to the Commissioner.
(e) The award shall be unenforceable until the notice required by subsection
(d) is received by the Commissioner.
Id.
98 See Casey, supra note 7, at 2-3.
99 See 35 U.S.C. § 294(b). This requirement that the arbitrator consider the
applicable law is in some ways analogous to the situation in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), and the threat of judicial scrutiny
of the award will presumably be sufficient to ensure that the arbitrator does so. In
Gilmer, the Supreme Court cited Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, for the
proposition that for statutory claims cases, judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards is
sufficient to assure arbitrator compliance with the applicable statute. See Gilmer, 500
U.S. at 32 n.4 (citing McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987)). In a case examining the
scope of judicial review of awards under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), the Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit found that:
The grounds listed in the FAA, however, are not exclusive. Indeed, even in
the context of arbitration in collective bargaining-where judicial review of arbitral
awards is extremely limited-awards may be set aside if they are contrary to
"some explicit public policy" that is "well defined and dominant" and ascertained
"by reference to the laws and legal precedents."
Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting United
Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43 (1987) (quoting Muschany v.
United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945))). Thus, judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards in
cases involving some well-defined public policy (such as patent infringement cases)
would seem to be particularly subject to judicial scrutiny.
100 See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994).
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patent invalidity (and almost all accused infringers do raise this defense), 101
an arbitrator must consider this defense and must address this defense in the
written judgment and award. Furthermore, to be enforceable, an arbitration
award must be filed with the PTO, and the PTO is instructed to enter the
award into the public prosecution history of the patent in question.102 The
combination of the required consideration of defenses including invalidity
with the required public filing of the arbitration award means that the
public interest in preventing private settlements from hiding invalid patents
has been addressed in the statute.
The conclusion that Congress meant to address this public interest is
also borne out by the legislative history of 35 U.S.C. § 294. The House
Report on the bill states that arbitration agreements are to be filed with the
PTO.10 3 Only after stating this requirement does the report go on to state
that arbitration would "advance the public interest, 'enhance the patent
system... promote innovation' and 'relieve some of the burden on the
overworked Federal courts."' 104 It does not seem, then, that in passing 35
U.S.C. § 294, Congress meant to sanction the private settlement of patent
infringement and validity matters where the resulting settlements would
never see the light of day.
C. Public Disclosure of Interference Settlements
Another area of patent law under which settlement of disputes over
patent validity must undergo public scrutiny is with private settlement of
patent interferences. Under 35 U.S.C. § 135(c), once an interference has
been declared between parties by the PTO, any private settlement
agreement between the parties must be filed with the PTO as with
arbitration awards.105 According to the Federal Circuit, 35 U.S.C. § 135(c)
was enacted to prevent anticompetitive settlements between parties involved
in an interference.10 6 Also, the Sixth Circuit, before the creation of the
101 See Rockey, supra not6 27, at 148; see also DONALD S. CHISUM & MICHAEL
A. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 2F[4][a], at 2-281 (1992)
(discussing defenses in patent infringement suits).
102 See 35 U.S.C. § 294(d), (e). For the text of this statute, see supra note 97.
103 See H.R. REP. No. 97-542, at 12-13 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
765, 777.
104 Casey, supra note 7, at 3 n.8 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 97-542, at 13 (1982),
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 765, 777).
105 See 35 U.S.C. § 135(c) (1994).
106 See CTS Corp. v. Piher Int'l Corp., 727 F.2d 1550, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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Federal Circuit, observed that 35 U.S.C. § 135(c) was designed to prevent
an applicant for a patent from obtaining an invalid patent monopoly through
a private settlement. 10 7
The courts have also found a linkage between settlement of patent
interferences and antitrust concerns. For example, in United States v.
Singer Manufacturing Co., 108 the United States Supreme Court held that an
agreement to settle a dispute between conflicting patent rights may violate
the Sherman Act'0 9 when an agreement has the effect of excluding
competition.1 0 One Justice believed that the Court in Singer found that a
cross-licensing agreement in settlement of an interference proceeding is
presumptively bad if designed to avoid an open fight over the validity of
patents which are possibly invalid. 111
D. Judicial Scrutiny in the Antitrust Context
This linkage between patent settlements and antitrust concerns has also
been found outside of the context of patent interference proceedings. There
is a long history of court scrutiny of settlements of patent infringement
disputes when such settlements have raised antitrust concerns.112 For
example, in a case that was factually similar to Singer, but in the context of
a federal court litigation rather than an interference, a district court
invalidated a settlement agreement where the court found the purpose of the
agreement was to exclude a third party from the market in which the
107 See Moog Inc. v. Pegasus Lab., Inc., 521 F.2d 501, 505 (6th Cir. 1975).
108 374 U.S. 174 (1963).
109 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
110 See Singer, 374 U.S. at 195.
111 See id. at 198-200 (White, J., concurring).
112 For a detailed discussion of the intersection between patent infringement
settlements and antitrust laws, see generally Mark A. Radcliffe, Antitrust Pitfalls in
Licensing, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTITRUST 1995, at 523 (PLI Patents,
Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 414, 1995);
Gerald Sobel, Exploitation of Patents and the Antitrust Laws, in TECHNOLOGY
LICENSING AND LITIGATION 1996, at 115 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, &
Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 431, 1996); Gerald Sobel, Exploitation
of Patents and the Antitrust Laws, in TECHNOLOGY LICENSING AND LITIGATION 1995, at
303 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Property Course Handbook
Series No. 404, 1995).
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litigants competed." 3 Furthermore, where a patentee knowingly tries to
enforce an invalid patent, this too has been found to violate antitrust
laws." 4 In yet another type of case, a patent owner wanted to avoid
litigation of a patent that counsel believed to be weak and so entered into a
private settlement agreement that was later found in the context of a price-
fixing scheme to be invalid as a violation of antitrust laws.115
The idea that it may be illegal for a patentee to settle an infringement
suit where a patentee believes her patent to be weak is particularly
disturbing in light of one advantage touted by Arnold for mediation of
patent disputes: that ADR permits a patent holder to avoid litigation of a
weak patent." 6 Many patent infringement suits settle by means of a sealed
consent decree, 117 and such decrees mean the public and thus possible
competitors of the patented material are never apprised of the possible
invalidity of the patent. If mediation of patent disputes is to be fostered by
public support in the courts, then a solution to the problem of sealed private
settlements against the public interest may need to be found.
VI. CONCLUSION: A PROPOSAL FOR SCRUTINY OF
PUBLIC-SPONSORED MEDIATION SETTLEMENTS OF
PATENT INFRINGEMENT DISPUTES
The preceding discussion suggests that public encouragement of
mediated settlements is a two-edged sword. On the one hand, there is a
need for public encouragement of mediation of patent infringement disputes
for the same reasons as those in favor of public encouragement of
settlements generally; furthermore, the preceding discussion suggests that
mediation is effective in resolving disputes over patent rights. On the other
hand, there is also a need to avoid public encouragement of settlements that
hide the invalidity of patents. Court-sponsored ADR programs that result in
settlements that hide the invalidity of a patent are one example of the
general problem of the loss of public goods that results from removal of
cases from the traditional forum of public adjudication. This loss of public
113 See AG Fur Industrielle Electronik Agie v. Sodick, 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
69,311, 69,312 (N.D. II1. 1990).
114 See Crane & Pfunder, supra note 32, at 153-154.
115 See Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648, 675-687
(D.S.C. 1977).
116 See Arnold, Suggested Fornz of Contract to Arbitrate, supra note 35, at 269.
117 See Crane & Pfunder, supra note 32, at 151.
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goods is, in turn, one of a larger group of concerns that critics of publicly
sponsored ADR programs have levied against such programs.
Judge Jack B. Weinstein has suggested that "[p]rograms that involve
judicial oversight do not implicate the concerns otherwise associated with
ADR."' 118 As discussed above, there are already requirements in certain
cases that settlement agreements be subject to judicial or PTO scrutiny. One
solution to the problem of a patent holder maintaining an invalid patent by
a sealed settlement agreement would be to require disclosure or judicial
scrutiny of the terms of any settlement that arises after an infringement case
has been filed. Such a "sunshine regime" is not without its problems, 119 but
may provide some measure of protection to the public in exchange for the
very real benefits of patent ownership granted by the public to patent
owners.
Settlement documents do not enjoy any particular privilege that shields
them from disclosure. Numerous rationales have been advanced by
advocates of disclosure of settlement agreements, and courts have ordered
public disclosure in many cases. 120 Although the circuits are split on this
issue, where the settlement documents have been the subject of a protective
order, such an order may serve to keep settlement documents sealed. 121 At
the same time, where there is a demonstrated public interest in their
disclosure (such as under a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 122
request), courts have forced parties to disclose settlement documents even
while acknowledging that this may have a chilling effect on the other public
interest of fostering settlement of civil disputes. 123 Cases have explicitly
held that under the FOIA, the public interest in disclosure may outweigh
the privacy interests of litigants.124
There are already in place both statutory and judicially recognized
circumstances under which settlement agreements must be disclosed or
scrutinized by a judge presiding over particular types of cases. Of these
types of cases, those most closely analogous with respect to public interest
118 Weinstein, supra note 75, at 272.
119 See infra notes 136-142 and accompanying text.
120 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Public Access to Private Settlements: Conflicting
Legal Policies, 11 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH CosTs LITIG. 85, 85-87 (1993).
121 See Wayne D. Brazil, Protecting the Confidentiality of Settlement Negotiations,
39 HASTINGs L.J. 955, 1006-1007 (1988).
122 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994 & Supp. 111996).
123 See Brazil, supra note 121, at 1002-1004.
124 See id. at 1008-1010 (citing Norwood v. Federal Aviation Admin., 580 F.
Supp. 944, 998 (W.D. Tenn. 1984)).
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in patent infringement cases are shareholder derivative suits, class action
cases, medical malpractice cases, and antitrust cases. For shareholder
derivative suits, the court in which the suit is filed must approve any
settlement. 125 For class action cases, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(e), suits may not be settled in private.' 26 All members of the class have
an interest in the terms of the settlement, so they are entitled to know them.
All members of a class must be informed of the terms of the settlement.
For medical malpractice cases, entities such as insurance carriers are
required to disclose the terms of any settlements by filing a report with a
national registry under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act
(HCQIA).127 If a physician or dentist chooses to settle a malpractice case
privately without resort to insurance coverage, however, there is no
reporting requirement. 128 The circumstances and considerations leading to
public disclosure and judicial scrutiny in antitrust cases are discussed in
Part V.D above.
In more general commercial cases, various courts have described the
general influence that the public interest has on the decision to unseal
settlement documents such as consent decrees. For example, the Second
Circuit has stated that consent decrees and other settlement documents are
ordinarily not subject to judicial review where the parties have come to
terms that are mutually satisfactory, but "[t]he court has a larger role,
125 See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & J. MARK RAMSEYER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS AND CORPORATIONS 222 (2d ed.
1994).
126 "Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or
compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court
directs." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
12742 U.S.C. §§ 11131-11152 (1994). For an analysis of the HCQIA, see
generally Robert S. Adler, Stalking the Rogue Physician: An Analysis of the Health
Care Quality Inprovement Act, 28 AM. Bus. L.J. 683 (1991); Nolan N. Atkinson Jr.,
How the National Practitioner Data Bank Affects Medical Malpractice Clients, PRAC.
LITIG., Jan. 1994, at 35; Deborah G. Casey, Austin v. McNamara and the Health Care
Quality Improvement Act: From Speculation to Implementation, 14 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 389 (1990); Robert E. Kuelthau, Ambulatory Surgery Centers-Medical Clinics
and the National Practitioner Data Bank, 79 MARQ. L. REv. 819 (1996); Elisabeth
Ryzen, The National Practitioner Data Bank: Problems and Proposed Reforms, 13 J.
LEGAL MED. 409 (1992); Scott M. Smith, Annotation, Construction and Application of
Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (42 U.S.C.S. §§ 11101-11152), 121
A.L.R. FED. 255 (1994).
128 See American Dental Ass'n v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 445, 446 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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however, where a consent judgment or a settlement judgment resolves class
actions, shareholder derivative suits, bankruptcy claims, antitrust suits
brought by the United States, and any suits 'affecting the public
interest."' ' 129 The D.C. Circuit has cautioned that "a court should enter a
consent decree affecting the public interest only after considering the
substantive validity of the decree."'1 30
The Third Circuit recognizes a common law presumption of access to
private settlement agreements that flows from the common law right of
access to other court proceedings.' 31 Where parties have obtained a consent
decree from a court, this common law presumption of access is particularly
strong. In Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Hotel
Rittenhouse Association, the court found that the district court had abused
its discretion in failing, at the request of a third party, to unseal a settlement
agreement that was contained in a consent decree and had been entered into
between two commercial entities. 132 In forcing the unsealing of the
settlement agreement, the court stated:
Having undertaken to utilize the judicial process to interpret the
settlement and to enforce it, the parties are no longer entitled to invoke the
confidentiality ordinarily accorded settlement agreements. Once a
settlement is filed in the district court, it becomes a judicial record, and
subject to the access accorded such records. 133
The court acknowledged the strong public interest in encouraging
settlement and stated that it was likely that had the parties chosen to end
their dispute by filing a voluntary stipulation under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(a)(1) rather than by a consent decree under Federal Rule
41(a)(2), they would have been able to prevent public access to the
settlement agreement. 134 Thus, in the Third Circuit at least, the usual
129 Janus Films, Inc. v. Miller, 801 F.2d 578, 582 (2d Cir. 1986).
130 Adams v. Bell, 711 F.2d 161, 170 n.40 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (en banc).
131 See Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assoc.,
800 F.2d 339, 343 (3d Cir. 1986).
132 See id. at 346.
133 Id. at 345.
134 See id. at 344. Federal Rule 41(a) reads:
Voluntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof.
(I) By Plaintiff; by Stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e), of
Rule 66, and of any statute of the United States, an action may be dismissed by the
plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before
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termination of patent disputes via settlement agreements contained in
consent decrees arguably makes the settlements subject to public disclosure.
It is only a relatively small step, then, to require general disclosure of
settlement agreements of patent infringement disputes.
Such disclosure, however, would not be without some possible cost.
1 35
In the context of general openness of court documents, including discovery
now ordinarily subject to protective orders, some commentators fear that
disclosure might lead to invasions of privacy.1 36 Additional concerns have
been put forward that disclosure rules will lead to less liberal discovery.1
37
Commentators also worry that disclosure of settlements will reduce the
frequency of settlements. 138 Other concerns with required disclosure of
settlements are that parties may avoid the court system if they are forced to
disclose the terms of their settlements, 139 and that the disclosures may do
harm to innocent third parties or the litigants themselves. 140 Many of these
concerns have been argued to be over-blown, 141 and it is important to
service by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment,
whichever first occurs, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all
parties who have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of
dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of
dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who
has once dismissed in any court of the United States or of any state an action based
on or including the same claim.
(2) By Order of Court. Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this subdivision
of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon
order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper.
If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon the
defendant of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed
against the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for
independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a
dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice.
FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a). Note that Rule 41(a)(2) requires judicial review of voluntary
dismissal.
135 For a thorough discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of sunshine
regimes in the context of products liability cases, see Luban, supra note 75, at 2648-
2658.
136 See Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to
the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REv. 427, 465 (1991).
137 See id.
t38 See id. at 486; cf. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 120, at 87.
139 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 120, at 87.
140 See id.; see also Luban, supra note 75, at 2657.
141 See Luban, supra note 75, at 2647-2658.
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realize that an inventor need not seek a patent and a patent holder need not
choose to litigate. Where the patent is granted and the case is filed, the
patent holder is asking the state to enforce a set of rights that the state
granted in exchange for disclosure of all the relevant details about the
patentability of the invention. The outcome of a litigation is relevant to the
patentability and should thus arguably be disclosed as part of the exchange
for the patent rights.
Mediations, unlike arbitrations, do not have a neutral factfinder and
decisionmaker whose obligation it is to see that the letter and policies of the
law are upheld. Even with arbitrations, where there are significant public
interests at stake, enforcement of the law as interpreted by court cases, if
not done properly, will require judicial intervention. 142 As Chief Judge
Harry T. Edwards observed:
Arbitrators, however, must be mindful that the [Supreme] Court's
endorsement [of arbitration of statutory claims] has been based on the
assumption that "competent, conscientious, and impartial arbitrators" will
be available to decide these cases. . . . Therefore, arbitrators must step up
to the challenges presented by the resolution of statutory issues and must
be vigilant to protect the important rights embodied in the laws entrusted
to their care.
"Greater reliance on private process to protect public rights imposes a
professional obligation on arbitrators to handle statutory issues only if they
are prepared to fully protect the rights of statutory grievants."..... To
meet that obligation, arbitrators must educate themselves about the
law.... They must follow precedent and must adopt an attitude of
judicial restraint when entering undefined areas of the
law .... Arbitrators must actively ensure that the record is adequately
developed and that procedural fairness is provided .... And appointing
agencies like AAA must be certain that only persons who are able to
satisfy these criteria are added to arbitrator-panel lists. For if arbitrators
and agencies do not meet these obligations, the courts will have no choice
but to intercede. 143
142 See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
143 Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1488 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 634 (1985);
Calvin William Sharpe, Adjusting the Balance Between Public Rights and Private
Process: Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 45TH
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATION 161, 179 (1993),
respectively).
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Mediation represents another private process on which society is relying for
protection of public rights. Without a professional decisionmaker, then,
courts may reasonably be expected to meet the obligation of proper
handling of statutory issues arising in patent infringement cases undergoing
mediation.
Early in this century, the United States Supreme Court recognized that
in scrutinizing settlement agreements between parties to a patent
infringement dispute, courts need to strike a balance between preventing
anticompetitive agreements that violate antitrust laws and permitting
disputants to settle their differences in an amicable and mutually beneficial
way so as to foster economic growth. 144 If the Supreme Court believes it is
both feasible and desirable to require judicial scrutiny of patent dispute
settlements in the context of antitrust litigation, then perhaps the Court or
Congress will someday call for similar scrutiny in the general context of
court-sponsored mediation agreements.
144 See Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 169-170
(1931). Such scrutiny is required under terms of the Tunney Act. See Antitrust
Procedures & Penalties Act (Tunney Act), Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706 (1974)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3, 16, 28; 47 U.S.C. § 401(d); 49 U.S.C. §§ 44-45) (no
currently effective sections).
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Figure 4: Estimated Total Costs of Litigation and of Ineffective
Mediations
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